Abstract-Timed-Release Encryption(TRE) is an encryption mechanism that allows a receiver to decrypt a ciphertext only after the time that a sender designates. In this paper, we propose the notion of Timed-Release Certificateless Encryption(TRCLE), and define its security models. We also show a generic construction of TRCLE from Public-Key Encryption(PKE), IdentityBased Encryption(IBE) and one-time signature, and prove that the constructed scheme achieves the security we defined.
I. INTRODUCTION This paper introduces the notion of Timed-Release Certificateless Encryption (TRCLE). TRCLE is a variant of TimedRelease Encryption (TRE)
, in which a sender can generate a ciphertext designating a time to decrypt it, and a receiver can decrypt the ciphertext only after the designated time.
A TRCLE system consists of a key generation center (KGC), a time server (TS), senders and receivers. The KGC helps a receiver to generate a decryption key corresponding to the ID and public key of a receiver. The TS periodically broadcasts a time signal corresponding to the current time. A sender encrypts a message using an ID and a public key of a receiver and a time after which the ciphertext could be decrypted. The receiver decrypts the ciphertext using the decryption key and the time signal corresponding to the time designated by the sender. The TRCLE system does not allow the KGC to obtain the decryption key of receiver, and then it allows only the receiver to decrypt the ciphertext only after the designated time.
The decryption key consists of two keys, a partial secret key and user secret key. Since the former is generated by the KGC and the user but the latter only by the user, the KGC does not know the whole decryption key and cannot decrypt ciphertext.
II. APPLICATION
TRCLE has an application to online "sealed-bid auction" in online community in which each registered user has an ID. In the auction system, every user can become auctioneer by publicizing his ID and public key. Each bidder encrypts his price by using the auctioneer's ID and public key and submits the ciphertext as sealed-bid. The auctioneer can decrypt all bids only after the pre-determined closing time. In the sealedbid auction based on TRCLE, each user determines whether he trusts the auctioneer of ID and attends the auction by checking the reputations and the transaction records in the past auctions organized by the user of ID. Every user easily starts a sealedbid auction based on TRCLE, since it does not requires heavy infrastructure linking public keys to ID such as Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI).
III. RELATED WORKS
There is another variant of TRE, Timed-Release IdentityBased Encryption (TRIBE) [3] [4] . In TRIBE, a user can decrypt a ciphertext only when the user has the receiver's secret key and the time signal generated by TS. Then, if the receiver does not have the time signal or the TS does not have the secret key, they cannot decrypt the ciphertext. In [3] , two security models of TRIBE are defined. One is security against malicious receiver, IND-ID-CCA CR security. The other is security against malicious TS, IND-ID-CCA TS security. A generic construction of TRIBE that achieves the security is also shown in [3] . It is a combination of two IBE schemes and a one-time signature schemes, based on "Parallel Encryption" by Dodis-Katz [5] , and the security is proved in the standard model. TRCLE has an advantage over TRIBE in that a compromised KGC cannot decrypt any ciphertext since the key generation process is split between the KGC and the user. Then we discuss only security against malicious KGC in this paper. The other security is proved in almost the same way as in TRIBE.
TRCLE can be considered also a variant of Certificateless Encryption (CLE) [6] having the mechanism of TRE. In CLE, the decryption key is partially determined by KGC
IV. CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we introduce timed-release certificateless encryption (TRCLE) and define its security models including security against malicious KGC, Mal.KGC security. We also present a generic construction of TRCLE. It is a combination of a Public-Key Encryption(PKE) scheme, two Identity-Based Encryption(IBE) schemes and a one-time signature schemes, also based on "Parallel Encryption". We see that if the primitive PKE scheme is indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks(IND-CCA) secure and the primitive one-time signature scheme is one-time strong existential unforgeability against chosen message attacks(OT-sEUF-CMA) secure, then the constructed TRCLE scheme is Mal.KGC secure in the standard model.
V. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review public-key encryption (PKE), identity-based encryption (IBE) and one-time signature, which we use later.
A. Public-Key Encryption
Let λ be a security parameter. An public-key encryption scheme PKE [7] consists of three probabilistic polynomialtime algorithms PKE = (PKE.Gen, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec). The key generation algorithm PKE.Gen takes λ as input, and outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk . The encryption algorithm PKE.Enc takes pk , a message m as inputs, and outputs a ciphertext c. The decryption algorithm PKE.Dec takes a secret key sk and a ciphertext c as inputs, and outputs the plaintext m ′ or ⊥. These algorithms are assumed to satisfy that if (pk , sk ) = PKE.Gen(λ) then PKE.Dec(sk , PKE.Enc(pk , m)) = m for any m.
1) IND-CCA Security:
We review a standard security notion for PKE: indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) security. We here describe the IND-CCA security for PKE scheme PKE based on the following IND-CCA game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
Setup
C runs (pk , sk ) ← PKE.Gen(λ). C sends pk to A and keeps sk secret.
Phase1
A We define an advantage of A in the IND-CCA game as Adv
2 |, in which the probability is taken over the random coins used by C and A. We say that the PKE scheme PKE is IND-CCA secure if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, the function Adv
B. Identity-Based Encryption
Let λ be a security parameter. An identity-based encryption scheme IBE [8] 
1) IND-ID-CCA Security:
We review a standard security notion for IBE: indistinguishability against adaptive identity and chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-ID-CCA) security [9] . We here describe the IND-ID-CCA security for IBE scheme IBE based on the following IND-ID-CCA game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
Setup
C runs (params, msk ) ← IBE.Setup(λ). C sends params to A and keeps msk secret.
Phase1
A 
We define an advantage of A in the IND-ID-CCA game as Adv
|, in which the probability is taken over the random coins used by C and A. We say that the IBE scheme IBE is IND-ID-CCA secure if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, the function Adv
C. One-time Signature
Let λ be a security parameter. A signature scheme SIG consists of three probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms SIG = (SigGen, Sign, Verify). The key generation algorithm SigGen takes λ as input, and outputs a signing key sk and a verification key vk . The signing algorithm Sign takes sk and a message m as inputs , and outputs a signature σ. The verification algorithm Verify takes vk , a message m, and a signature σ as inputs, and outputs accept or reject. These algorithms are assumed to satisfy that if (sk , vk ) = SigGen(λ) then Verify(vk , m, Sign(sk , m)) = accept for any m.
1)
OT-sEUF-CMA Security: We review a security notion for one-time signature scheme: one-time strong existential unforgeability against chosen message attacks (OT-sEUF-CMA) security [10] . We here describe the OT-sEUF-CMA security for signature scheme SIG based on the following OTsEUF-CMA game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
Setup
C runs the (sk, vk) ← SigGen(λ). C sends vk to A and keeps sk secret.
Query
A can issue a signing query m to C only once. C responds to the singing query m by running σ = Sign(vk , m) and returning σ to A.
We define the advantage of A in the OT-sEUF-CMA game as Adv
, in which the probability is taken over the random coins used by C and A. We say that the signature scheme SIG is OT-sEUF-CMA secure if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, the function Adv
VI. TIMED-RELEASE CERTIFICATELESS ENCRYPTION(TRCLE)
In this section, we introduce timed-release certificateless encryption(TRCLE) scheme and define its security models.
A TRCLE system consists of a key generation center (KGC), a time server (TS), senders and receivers. The KGC helps a receiver to generate a partial secret key corresponding to an ID of the receiver. The TS periodically broadcasts a time signal corresponding to the current time. A sender encrypts a message using the ID and public key of a receiver, and a time after which the ciphertext could be decrypted. The receiver decrypts the ciphertext using the partial secret key, the user secret key and the time signal corresponding to the time designated by the sender.
Let λ be a security parameter. An timed-release certificateless encryption scheme T RCLE consists of seven probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms T RCLE = (KGC Setup, TS Setup, PartialKeyGen, UserKeyGen, Release, Encrypt, Decrypt). The key generation center's setup algorithm KGC Setup takes λ as input, and outputs a public parameter params and a master secret key msk . The time server's setup algorithm TS Setup takes λ as input, and outputs a public key tpk and the corresponding secret key tsk . The partial secret key generation algorithm PartialKeyGen takes params, msk and ID as input, and outputs a partial secret key psk ID corresponding to ID. The user key generation algorithm UserKeyGen takes params and ID as input, and outputs a user public key upk ID and a user secret key usk ID corresponding to ID. 
A. Security
We can consider security against KGC, TS, receiver or outsider. Since the TS security is implied by KGC security, we present the three kinds of security.
1)
Mal.KGC Security: We introduce a security notion for TRCLE: indistinguishability against adaptive identity and chosen ciphertext attacks by key generation center (Mal.KGC) security. This security ensures that a malicious key generation center, who has a master secret key msk , cannot obtain any information of message from a ciphertext without a user secret key usk ID . We here describe the Mal.KGC security for a TRCLE scheme T RCLE based on the following Mal.KGC game between a challenger C and adversary A.
Setup
C runs (tpk, tsk) ← TS Setup(λ) and sends (λ, tpk , tsk ) to A. A runs (params, msk ) ← KGC Setup(λ) and sends params to C. C creates an empty list List.
Phase1
A can adaptively issue the following four queries. We define an advantage of A in the Mal.KGC game as Adv
Create User query
2 |, in which the probability is taken over the random coins used by C and A. We say that the TRCLE scheme T RCLE is Mal.KGC secure if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, the function Adv
2) Mal.Receiver Security: We introduce a security notion for TRCLE: indistinguishability against adaptive identity and chosen ciphertext attacks by receiver (Mal.Receiver) security. This security ensures that a malicious receiver, who has a partial secret key psk ID and user secret key usk ID , cannot obtain any information of message from a ciphertext without a time signal d T corresponding to the time designated by the sender. We here describe the Mal.Receiver security for a TRCLE scheme T RCLE based on the following Mal.Receiver game between a challenger C and adversary A.
Setup
C runs (params, msk) ← KGC Setup(λ), (tpk, tsk) ← TS Setup(λ), and sends (λ, tpk , tsk ) to A. C creates an empty list List.
Phase1
A can adaptively issue the following five queries. We define an advantage of A in the Mal.Receiver game as Adv
Create User query
2 |, in which the probability is taken over the random coins used by C and A. We say that the TRCLE scheme T RCLE is Mal.Receiver secure if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, the function Adv
3) Outsider Security: We introduce a security notion for TRCLE: indistinguishability against adaptive identity and chosen ciphertext attacks by outsider (Outsider) security. This security ensures that a outsider, who has a public parameter params and tpk , cannot obtain any information of message from a ciphertext without user secret key usk ID . We here describe the Outsider security for a TRCLE scheme T RCLE based on the following Outsider game between a challenger C and adversary A.
Setup
C runs (params, msk) ← KGC Setup(λ), (tpk, tsk) ← TS Setup(λ), and sends (params, tpk ) to A. C creates an empty list List.
Phase1
A can adaptively issue the following six queries. We define an advantage of A in the Outsider game as Adv
Create User query
2 |, in which the probability is taken over the random coins used by C and A. We say that the TRCLE scheme T RCLE is Outsider secure if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, the function Adv 
VII. CONSTRUCTION
Here we present a generic construction of TRCLE scheme from PKE scheme, IBE scheme and one-time signature scheme.
A. Construction
Let ∆ = (PKE.Gen, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec) be a publickey encryption scheme, Π = (IBE.Setup, IBE.Ext, IBE.Enc, IBE.Dec) and
′ .Dec) be identity-based encryption schemes, and Σ = (SigGen, Sign, Verify) be a one-time signature scheme.
A TRCLE scheme Γ = (KGC Setup, TS Setup, PartialKeyGen, UserKeyGen, Release, Encrypt, Decrypt) is constructed as follows.
KGC Setup(λ):
Step 1: Run IBE.Setup on input λ to generate (params, msk ).
Step 2: Return (params, msk ). TS Setup(λ):
Step 1: Run IBE ′ .Setup on input λ to generate (params ′ , msk ′ ).
Step 2: Set tpk = params ′ and tsk = msk ′ .
Step 3: Return (tpk , tsk ). PartialKeyGen(params, msk , ID):
Step 1: Run IBE.Ext(params, msk , ID) to obtain d ID .
Step 2: Return d ID . UserKeyGen(params, ID):
Step 1: Run PKE.Gen on input λ to generate (pk , sk ).
Step 2: Set upk ID = pk and usk ID = sk .
Step 3: Return (upk ID , usk ID ). Release(tpk , tsk , T ):
Step
Step 1: Run SigGen on input λ to generate (sk , vk ).
Step Step 7: Compute σ = Sign(sk , c 1 ||c 2 ||c 3 ||ID||T ).
Step 8: Set c = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , ID, T , vk , σ) .
Step 9: Return c.
Step 1: Parse c as c
Step 2: If Verify(vk , c 1 ||c 2 ||c 3 ||ID||T , σ) = reject , then return ⊥ and stop.
Step 
If ∆ is an IND-CCA secure public-key encryption scheme and Σ is an OT-sEUF-CMA secure one-time signature scheme, then Γ is a Mal.KGC secure timed-release certificateless encryption scheme.
Proof(Theorem 1)
Suppose A is an adversary that breaks the Mal.KGC security of Γ. We construct a simulator B which breaks the IND-CCA security of the PKE scheme ∆ using A. Here we say a ciphertext c = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , ID, T 
Proof(Claim 1)
We assume Forge occurs. Then, we construct a forger F who breaks OT-sEUF-CMA security of the onetime signature scheme Σ, from A. The description of F is as follows.
Setup
F receives vk * from C. F runs (tpk , tsk ) ← TS Setup(λ) and sends (λ, tpk , tsk ) to A. 
Proof(Claim 2)
We construct an adversary B who breaks IND-CCA security of the PKE scheme ∆ using A. The description of B is as follows.
Setup
B receives pk * from C. Then B runs (tpk , tsk ) ← TS Setup(λ) and sends (λ, tpk , tsk ) to A and randomly chooses index i ∈ {1, 2, · · · q}. B creates an empty list List.
Phase1
The response of B for A's queries is as follows.
